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Crop insurance has become an important 
part of the national agricultural system 
in the United States. It was instituted to 
protect farmer incomes in times of vola-
tile production, for example because of 
droughts or floods. Although crop insur-
ance was not designed to impact water 
resources, it may have unintended conse-
quences for water use, because agriculture 
and water resources are tightly linked. In 
particular, crop production relies on water 
as an input, and irrigation for crop produc-
tion is the largest user of water resources. 
Thus, if crop insurance changes farmer 
behavior, it may affect water use as well. 
Crop insurance is expected to become 
more important to farmers in the future, 
as the frequency of production losses in-
crease under a changing climate, such as 
from droughts, floods, or pest outbreaks. 
At the same time, a changing climate will 
affect the availability of water resources. 
For these reasons, it is important to un-
derstand the relationship between crop 
insurance, agriculture, and water use. 
This policy brief provides an overview 
of recent research on the relationship 
between crop insurance, agriculture, 
and water use. First, we describe the 
setting in Illinois. Next, we explain why 
crop insurance may impact water use, 
and we discuss estimates of the effects 
of crop insurance on water use. Finally, 
we detail the reasons why crop insur-
ance impacts water use. We conclude 
by discussing implications for policy.
Crop insurance, water use and agricul-
ture in Illinois
Water use falls into two main categories. 
“Withdrawal uses” refer to water that is 
taken out of a lake or stream to be used 
but then may be returned to the same 
body of water to be available for other 
water uses. This category of use is dis-
tinct from “non-withdrawal uses” of water, 
such as boating on a reservoir or fishing 
in a river. This policy brief focuses only 
on withdrawal uses of water, primarily 
because the U.S. Geological Survey pro-
vides this water withdrawal information 
for each county and economic sector. 
In Illinois, water withdrawals for cool-
ing power plants represent the majority 
of water withdrawals. Water for irriga-
tion is another major withdrawal use 
of water. Irrigation water withdrawals 
are important to consider because they 
are a “consumptive use of water,” which 
means that water withdrawn for irriga-
tion is no longer available for use in the 
immediate area. The reason is that most 
irrigation water applied to farm fields 
evaporates and does not return to the 
water body from which it was withdrawn. 
In most states, irrigation is the dominant 
withdrawal use of water. In Illinois, how-
ever, plentiful and regular supplies of rain-
fall mean that only a small fraction of wa-
ter is withdrawn to irrigate crops. In 2010, 
226 million gallons per day of water were 
withdrawn to irrigate crops in Illinois, ac-
counting for approximately 2 percent of 
water withdrawals in the state (Maupin et 
al 2014). Rainfall patterns are projected to 
change in Illinois as the climate becomes 
more variable, so demand for irrigation 
will likely increase (Baylis et al 2015). 
Illinois has more than 26 million acres 
under agricultural operation and ranks 
7th in the nation in value of agricultural 
production (USDA, 2017). Illinois agricul-
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ture is part of the corn and soy belt of the United States, a vi-
tal rain-fed agricultural production region (Franzluebbers, 
2011). Crop insurance has become an important part of 
the agricultural production system in Illinois. In 2016, 10.1 
million acres of corn were insured in Illinois, correspond-
ing to 87 percent of planted acreage (Schnitkey, 2016).
Impact of crop insurance on water use
Why might crop insurance impact water use? First, crop in-
surance may change farmers’ irrigation decisions. In a dry 
year, for example, crop insurance may make farmers less like-
ly to water their crops, because watering is costly and they 
understand they will receive insurance payouts (“indemni-
ties”) in the event of crop failure. This behavior is commonly 
called “moral hazard.” Insurance companies know that crop 
insurance may cause farmers to water less than is optimal, 
so their policies typically require that farmers demonstrate 
they have irrigated a “normal” quantity of water before re-
ceiving insurance payouts in the event of a drought. This 
policy clause, in turn, may in some cases lead farmers to 
use more water on their crops than they otherwise would. 
The second channel through which crop insurance may 
affect water use is crop choice. Since crop insurance re-
duces the cost of failure, it can lead farmers to plant crops 
that have highly variable payouts: if the crop yield is high, 
then the farmer reaps the benefit, but if the yield is low 
then the farmer does not bear all of the costs. If these 
types of crops are more water-intensive than the origi-
nal crop mix, then water use will increase. Finally, anoth-
er complication is that changed water use by one farmer 
in response to crop insurance may have no effect on to-
tal water use in an area if water rights are scarce. In such 
cases, a decrease in use by one farmer may simply allow 
another farmer to increase her use. Thus, the impact of 
crop insurance on water use is an empirical question.
Point One: Evidence that crop insurance leads to more 
water use in agriculture 
Here, we investigate the impact of crop insurance on 
water use. Figure 1 presents maps of crop insurance cov-
erage and irrigation in the United States.1 The change 
in crop insurance from 1985 to 2001 is shown in map 
A. The change in irrigation withdrawals from 1985 to 
2001 is shown in map B. Figure 1 shows no clear vi-
sual trends. To gain a better understanding of the re-
lationship between crop insurance and water use in 
agriculture, we turn to a formal statistical analysis. 
First, we report an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis across U.S. counties, using the change between 
1985 and 2001 for each county.2 This analysis reveals that 
a 1 percent increase in crop insurance is associated with a 
0.05% increase in irrigation (column 1 of Table 1). However, 
this OLS analysis does not prove that the increase in crop in-
surance causes the increase in irrigation. Farmers choose for 
themselves whether to purchase crop insurance, and farm-
1 Deryugina, T. and M. Konar (2017). “Impacts of crop insurance on water withdrawals for irrigation” Advances in Water Resources, doi: 10.1016/j.
advwatres.2017.03.013
2 The change from 1985 to 2001 is reported for each of the 2,007 counties in the analysis. Excluded from the analysis were 1,000 counties without 
data on water use or on crop insurance, either in 1985 or in 2001. 
ers who purchase insurance may differ from farmers who 
do not purchase insurance in ways that are related to their 
use of water resources. For example, farmers who are risk-
averse may be both more likely to buy crop insurance and 
more likely to irrigate their crops. Additionally, it is possible 
that it is anticipation of scarce water resources that causes 
increased insurance demand among farmers and not the 
other way around. For these reasons, we will also employ 
more sophisticated econometric methods to establish 
whether additional crop insurance causes more water use.
Figure 1: Maps of the percentage change from 1985 to 2001 
in acres insured (Panel A) and in water withdrawals for 


















Notes: In Figure 2, the percent change in insured acres from 1985 to 2001 
ranges from -4.52% to +6.57% (Panel A). The percent change in water 
withdrawals for irrigation from 1985 to 2001 ranges from -5.66% to 
+3.47% (Panel B). White shading indicates that data are not available for 
that county.
Specifically, the analysis uses an instrumental variables 
(IV) regression to assess the impact of crop insurance on 
water use. This methodology takes advantage of a factor 
that affects the propensity to purchase crop insurance, but 
otherwise has no direct effect on water use. For this pur-
pose, the 1994 Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act is used 
as the instrument. Insured acreage increased dramatically 
in response to this policy mandate. Thus, the 1994 policy 
impacted crop insurance (i.e. number of acres insured). 
Because it likely had no direct effect on water use, how-
ever, it meets the necessary conditions of the IV approach. 
The time series of insured acreage is provided in Figure 2, 
in which 1995 has been highlighted to indicate when the 
1994 policy mandate took effect. A dramatic increase in in-
sured acreage between 1994 and 1995 is clear in the figure.
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Table 1: Percentage change in water withdrawals (first two 
columns) and percentage change in acres insured, for a 1 
percent change in crop insurance.
Change in log water withdrawals Change in log 
acres insured
OLS IV First stage
















1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2 *** denotes significance at the 1% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level 
3 Dependent variable indicated at the top of the columns 
4 All regressions include each of the year-to-year changes in insured acres (in logs) over 
1989-1994 as controls.
 
To exploit this policy change in our analysis, the “first 
stage” of the IV method uses the fact that counties that 
already had high insurance coverage were less affected 
than counties where coverage was low. Intuitively, cover-
age rates (i.e., the percent of farm acres that are insured) 
cannot exceed 100 percent, and counties that are closer 
to having 100 percent uptake have less scope to increase 
their insurance coverage. For example, a county where 
only a third of the acres are insured is impacted by the in-
surance mandate much more than a county where three 
quarters of the acres are insured. Thus, insurance cover-
age in 1994 can be used to help predict future changes 
in coverage, since higher 1994 insurance coverage implies 
smaller increases in coverage between 1990 and 1995. 
Specifically, this first stage predicts the change of insur-
ance take-up that is driven by the 1994 policy change. 
Results are provided in column 3 of Table 1. As we would 
expect, the negative estimate (–0.15) means that counties 
that already had high insurance penetration rates in 1994 
saw smaller increases in insurance uptake between 1990 
and 1995. Specifically, for every additional percentage 
point of insurance coverage that a county had in 1994, it 
experienced 0.15 percent less insurance increase in 1995.
Next, we report the second stage of the IV estimates, 
namely, the effect of this change in crop insurance on 
the resulting change in water use. The coefficient in col-
umn 2 of Table 1 is positive (0.22) and statistically signif-
icant. These results indicate that a 1 percent increase in 
insured acreage causes a 0.22 percent increase in wa-
ter withdrawals for irrigation. It is also about four times 
larger than the corresponding OLS estimate, suggesting 
that the OLS estimate was subject to considerable bias.
3 The riparian doctrine is a system of water law in which the owner of land bordering a water body is able to use that water. The prior appropriate 
doctrine provides the legal right to use water based on who was first to put that water to ‘beneficial use’.
Figure 2: U.S. insured crop acreage from 1980 to 2010 (the 
1994 Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act took effect in 1995) 
portion of the United States, while the ‘prior appropriation 
doctrine’ is observed in the western part of the country.3 In 
contrast, groundwater resources are typically not subject 
to any water law or policy, and are often overused. Also, 
surface water bodies are also more variable than ground-
water resources, since they change with weather. Access 
to groundwater resources typically requires private invest-
ment by a farmer to drill a well, which often requires sub-
stantial upfront cost. By contrast, surface water infrastruc-
ture like dams and aqueducts are often built by government 
agencies, making surface water extremely cheap for farm-
ers.
The IV analysis shows that a 1 percent increase in insured 
acres leads to a 0.15 percent increase in surface water use 
(Table 2). However, the same 1 percent increase in insured 
acres leads to a 0.28 percent increase in groundwater use. 
Thus, our results suggest that the crop insurance mandate 
leads to the depletion of national groundwater resourc-
es, which are likely to be of increased importance under 
a changing climate, when surface water supplies become 
more variable.
Table 2: Percentage change in water withdrawals by source, 
for a one percent change in crop insurance 
 
Total Surface Groundwater















1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
2 *** denotes significance at the 1% level. * denotes significance at the 10% 
level. 
3 Dependent variable is 5-year change in log water withdrawal by type. 
Water type indicated at the top of the columns. 
4 Growth controls include each fo the year-to-year change in insured acres 
(in logs) over 1989-1994 as controls.
Point Two: Crop insurance has more effect on ground-
water than on surface water
Next, we estimate how much of the total effect of crop 
insurance on water withdrawals is from surface water 
or groundwater.  Understanding this breakdown is im-
portant for public policy. Surface water is subject to wa-
ter laws; the ‘riparian doctrine’ is followed in the eastern 
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Point Three: Crop insurance leads farmers to switch 
crops
Crop insurance may also lead farmers to change their 
crop mix. For example, it may cause them to switch to 
more water-intensive crops. Table 3 presents results for 
the change in the harvested area by crop. The harvest-
ed areas of corn and soy fall when farmers increase their 
use of insurance, while results for rice are not statistical-
ly significant. The harvested area of cotton and wheat 
increased: a 1percent increase in crop insurance leads to 
a 0.10 percent increase in wheat acreage, corresponding 
to almost 58,000 acres, and to a 0.62 percent increase in 
cotton acreage, or almost 96,000 acres. So, crop insurance 
leads to a greater impact—in both relative and absolute 
terms—on cotton acreage than it does on wheat acre-
age. Additionally, cotton is a water-intensive crop, while 
wheat is typically rain-fed. For this reason, the increases 
in cotton acreage likely contribute to increased irrigation.
Table 3: Percentage change in harvested area by crop, 
for a 1 percent change in crop insurance



























1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2 *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. ** denotes significance at the 5 
percent level. 
3 Dependent variable is 5-year chane in acres harvested of different crops, as 
indicated at the top of the columns. 
4 Growth controls includes each of the year-to-year changes in insured acres (in 
logs) over 198901994 as controls.
 
Point Four: Farmers use more water per unit area
Crop insurance may also lead farmers to apply more wa-
ter per acre of land, reducing their efficiency of water 
use. Farmers may use water less efficiently if insurance 
reduces their total farm expenditures, inducing them to 
spend more on irrigation (or on electricity for ground-
water pumping). Moreover, the ‘normal’ irrigation clause 
that is present in many crop insurance contracts requires 
farmers to perform a minimal amount of watering in or-
der to be eligible for insurance payments. If farmers are 
unsure whether they are in compliance with this clause, 
then they may make a conservative decision to water 
their crops—even after the crop has failed—in order to 
guarantee the receipt of their insurance payment. Our re-
sults reveal that farmers apply more irrigation water per 
unit of irrigated area following the policy change. Unfor-
tunately, the data in this analysis are not sufficient to un-
derstand why farmers apply more water per acre of land. 
They could be either responding to the costs of farming 
or to the crop insurance policy requirements, or both. 
 
 
Crop insurance leads to more water use for irrigation in 
agriculture. Specifically, each 1 percent increase in in-
sured crop acreage causes a 0.22 percent increase in ir-
rigation withdrawals. The impact is more pronounced 
for groundwater withdrawals: a 1 percent increase in in-
sured acreage leads to a 0.28 percent increase in ground-
water withdrawals. Thus, an unintended consequence 
of the 1994 Federal Crop Insurance Reform Program 
could be the further depletion of national groundwa-
ter resources. Under a changing climate, surface water 
supplies are likely to become more variable. For this rea-
son, groundwater resources are likely to be of increased 
importance in the future for stabilizing our food supply. 
 
Crop switching is one important reason that crop insur-
ance increases irrigation withdrawals. For example, insur-
ance uptake leads farmers to grow more cotton, which is 
a water-intensive crop. Specifically, a 1 percent increase in 
insured acreage leads to a 0.62 percent increase in cotton 
acreage, or almost 96,000 acres. Crop insurance also increas-
es the volume of irrigation water applied per acre of land. 
This study highlights the importance of existing national 
data collection efforts related to water resources and crop 
insurance. Going forward, the scientific and policy com-
munities would benefit from enhancements to the qual-
ity, quantity, and detail of national water use information.
Crop insurance is an important component of the agri-
cultural production system in Illinois. As the climate be-
comes increasingly variable in Illinois (Baylis et al 2015), 
it will be important to identify opportunities to maintain 
farmer incomes while also conserving water resources. 
Since crop insurance has been shown to lead to more wa-
ter use nationwide, policy makers may want to explore 
options for insurance policy design that could help mit-
igate water use. Currently, Illinois does not heavily rely 
on irrigation supplies for agriculture, but may do so as 
precipitation patterns shift in the future. Now is a good 
time to start the conversation on potential interactions 
of crop insurance, agriculture, and water use in Illinois. 
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